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Cultural industries’ reliance on streams of novel cultural material requires grant-
ing creative employees significant degrees of autonomy within firms. In Bill
Ryan’s formulation, “capitalists cannot manage artists like they can other cate-
gories of worker” (1992, p. 34). This article expands on these findings by focusing
on key moments in the early history of cinematic animation and aspects of
contemporary animation production. Drawing on political-theoretical analyses of
employment to limn substantive limits to the autonomy of artists integrated into
Hollywood production, it shows that the institution of employment enables
cultural industry employers not only to dispossess artists of their creative
work(s), but also, when they deem it expedient, to manage artists like other
kinds of workers. It is a commonplace that control of intellectual property
through copyright law is foundational to the cultural industries; this article
argues that employment as a “mode of insertion of cultural labor into the general
process of production” (Miège 1992, p. 25) is similarly foundational and worthy
of explicit analysis. The problematization of employment illuminates lines of
force in the cultural industry workplace and helps to specify the political dimen-
sions of cultural work’s characteristic autonomy. The article concludes by
suggesting that what is conventionally read as an “art–commerce” contradiction
in the relations of cultural production can and should also be understood to
represent a deeply seated “democracy–employment” contradiction central to
liberal society. 
[T]ransfer of rights and control of labor become control of image property.
(Gaines 1991, p. 145)
Introduction
Cultural industries’ reliance on streams of novel cultural material requires grant-
ing creative employees significant degrees of autonomy within firms. In Bill
Ryan’s (1992, p. 34) formulation, “capitalists cannot manage artists like they can
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other categories of worker”. This article expands on these findings by focusing
on key moments in the early history of animation and aspects of contemporary
animation production. It draws on political-theoretical analyses of employment
to illuminate substantive limits to the autonomy of artists integrated into
Hollywood production. It shows that the institution of employment enables the
alienation of creative workers along two crucial axes. Employment enables
cultural industry employers not only to dispossess, but also, when they deem it
expedient, to manage artists like other kinds of workers. This article suggests
that consideration of employment’s politics opens up new angles of inquiry for
critical media scholarship.
While animation is distinct from other arenas of production (for example, live-
action film, television, video games), it shares with many fields three institu-
tional dependencies: on novelty and the zones of autonomy it requires; on the
control of production through the power to hire, direct, and fire employees; and
on the concentration of ownership of employee-created intellectual property
enabled by copyright. Research in the “cultural industries” tradition has devoted
much attention to the first of these dependencies, and to the de-alienating
effects it has on creative work and workers; the latter two have received less
attention. This article argues that cultural industry employers such as animation
studios satisfy the latter two needs through the legal structures of employment
and copyright law, but notes that, conversely, collective bargaining by unionized
creative workers sets limits on employers’ power to alienate along both axes.1
Though they are distinct from other creative workers in many particulars, the
status of animation workers as employee creators recommends them as exem-
plars of these institutional principles. Studios depend on their abilities to gener-
ate new material on a day-to-day basis; these workers must perform to the
expectations of their supervisors or jeopardize their employment (within limits
set by a union contract at signatory studios); and they have no authorial rights in
the products to which they contribute. Exploration of the relations between
animation studios and their employee creatives illustrates these principles in a
major cultural industry.
This article understands employment as a “mode of insertion of cultural labor
into the general process of production” (Miège 1989, p. 25). Other studies of
cultural labor’s insertion have different foci. For example, issues of subjectivity
and flexibility, individualization and discrimination, precariousness and emotional
labor feature in recent research from the United Kingdom (for example,
Hesmondhalgh & Baker 2008; McRobbie 2002; Ursell 2000). Independent contract-
ing or “freelance” work is an especially important mode of insertion in television
production and is used extensively in the United Kingdom and Hollywood.
Nevertheless, the engagement of creative workers as employees rather than inde-
pendent contractors remains an important element in the organization of
1.  ‘Alienation’ in the sense advocated by this article refers to the contractual alienability in liberal
society of rights as bits of property, not the fragmentation of ‘a transcendental subject whose
autonomy resides only in that space not yet colonised by political economy’ (Knights & Willmott ,
quoted in Ursell 2000, p. 809; see also Hesmondhalgh & Baker 2008, p. 116n7).
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commercial cultural production in the USA. Research in the emerging “production
studies” approach deals with workers as employees and independent contractors,
and is exemplified by the book Production Studies: Cultural Studies of Media
Industries (Mayer et al. 2009). Exemplary analyses focus on the gendered dimen-
sions of media labor and the spuriousness of official distinctions between creative
and technical labor (Banks 2009); the “management of alienation” by workers and
firms co-constructing the “new realities” of television production (Mayer 2009,
p. 22); and workers’ and firms’ critical and reflexive modes of meaning making
about film and television “work worlds” (Caldwell 2009c ). Putting to the side
distinctions between “creative” and “non-creative” work, this article poses
employment itself as a fulcrum of analysis. It proposes that critical media schol-
arship which aims to foreground cultural work qua work may broaden its demo-
cratic impetus by approaching employment explicitly, as a condition shared by
employed artists as well as other categories of worker.
Employment and Creative Autonomy
Employment is a two-edged sword, and both edges are decisive for creative
cultural workers. First, legal classification as employees under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 gives US cultural workers access to statutory protections,
on the basis of their presumed dependence on their employers, which are denied
those who work as independent contractors. These include unemployment bene-
fits, workers’ compensation, collective bargaining rights, minimum wages and
maximum hours, social security, pensions, occupational safety and health regu-
lations, and anti-discrimination protection (Linder 1989, p. 5). Second, the
obverse of protection/dependence is control/obedience. To be an employee is
to accept a “diminution … of autonomy and self-government” (Pateman 2002,
p. 38) in a hierarchy where “one person”, the employer, is “in a position to force
another person to choose between labor and some more disagreeable alternative
to the labor” (Steinfeld 2001, p. 19).2 “Employers,” writes Guy Davidov: 
always retain a position of power over their employees; to one extent or another,
they control them. The level of control varies from one employment relationship
to another, from employees who do (almost) as they wish to those who are not
very far from being slaves. But some control – an ability of capitalists and/or
managers to obtain desired work behaviour from workers – is always present.
(Davidov 2002, p. 381; original emphasis; citations omitted)
Nevertheless, despite its dominative politics, the employee rights and employer
obligations attaching to employment make it a highly desirable legal status for
those non-entrepreneurial individuals seeking security in work (Linder 1989).
2.  This perspective on control and obedience makes a different cut at the employment relation from
that of labor process theory (Ursell 2000). The perspective offered here derives from democratic
theory; control and obedience here reflect the fact that, as James Brown (2008) puts it, ‘if you don’t
work, you can’t eat’, and that if you do not do what you are told, you will not be employed for long.
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Considered in this light, the autonomy of creative cultural employees
perceived by researchers in the cultural industries tradition is exceptional. The
reliance of cultural industries on streams of new material, writes Hesmondhalgh
(2007, p. 6), requires that “[o]wners and executives make concessions to
symbol creators by granting them far more autonomy (self-determination) than
they would to workers of equivalent status in other industries and to most
workers historically” (original emphasis). While this autonomy is limited, argues
Hesmondhalgh (2007, p. 71), it “allows people who work creatively … to argue
for more time, space and resources than they might otherwise get from their
commercial paymasters”.
In addition to addressing the requirement of novelty, the institutionalization
of autonomy also serves a disciplinary function, enticing workers to discount
their work and arrange themselves more attractively to capital. Bernard Miège
(1989, p. 29) critiques creative workers’ autonomy as an invaluable smokescreen
behind which artists may be underpaid (see also Hesmondhalgh 2007, p. 208).
However, cultural industries researchers argue that the dark side of autonomy
does not necessarily cancel out the emancipatory potentials of creative work. No
matter what depredations and indignities creative workers suffer en route to the
creative workplace, firms’ dependence on their innovation protects them from
degrees of control routine in other workplaces. Mark Banks (2007, p. 102) writes
that “an overt emphasis on art has often provided workers with a sphere of rela-
tive autonomy where they could experiment and explore often counter-rational
and radical creative impulses”.
Notwithstanding creative workers’ significant relative autonomy, corporate
authorship3 depends on a principle of consensual, contractual, employment-based
alienation. Under what Davidov (2002, p. 380) calls employment’s “democratic
deficits”, individuals, as employees, transfer certain rights to self-determination
to their employers; under copyright’s “work-for-hire” doctrine, rights to intel-
lectual property are likewise transferred. Principles of control and appropriation
are central to the production of major-studio film animation in the USA, a case
that foregrounds contrasts between different forms and experiences of alienation,
as well as aspects of their development over time.4
Creative Work in Animation
Because of its intertwining of relations and representations of production,
commercial cinematic animation is a rich area for cultural labor research. The
changing norms of representation of animation labor around and within animated
films between 1900 and 1930 limn the historical course of employment’s role in
3.  Corporate authorship is commonly identified with the ability of a firm to direct, and concentrate
ownership of, collectively produced intellectual property.
4.  These principles are ambivalent; in streamlining corporate authorship they also create positions
for creative workers in firms. As Sito (2006, p. 12) writes: ‘[t]he assembly-line system relieves
artists of the burden of mastering business affairs’, enabling them to show up and draw for a living.
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the construction of animation labor and artists as alienated. A focus on “story-
board artists” brings into relief interactions of employment, autonomy, and
alienation in contemporary production.
Enchantment, Mastery and Representation
Prominent among the earliest animators were turn-of-the-century stage
performers known as “lightning sketchers”. These artists illustrated their story-
telling with drawings (on chalkboards or large sheets of paper) that would change
dramatically with their strokes of the chalk or pen. In the first decade of the
twentieth century, some of these artists began to employ the new technology of
stop-motion cinematography to “enchant” their drawings (Crafton 1982, pp. 44–
57). Two such performers, James Stuart Blackton and Winsor McCay, carried
their stage acts into the new medium of film. Their early films represent a tech-
nologically enhanced lightning sketch act in which sketches change and move
independently of the artist. The transcription and alteration of live artistic
performance as an originating moment of animation reverberates significantly
into the present. The relationship between animation artists, their characters
and stories, and their artistic/authorial work remain central themes, both liter-
ally and figuratively, within and around the cartoons themselves (Crafton 2003).
Blackton and McCay enacted their imagination, artistic skills, identity as
autonomous authors, and their mastery of mysterious new technologies before
the camera, performing both authority over and playful relationships with their
characters and stories. In his Enchanted Drawing (1900), as with others of his
films, Blackton draws and interacts with the character and props. Stop-motion
technology allows the character’s expression to change in response to Blackton’s
filmed actions, hiding some of the work of the lightning sketcher and “enchant-
ing” both the image and the artist (see Figure 1). McCay bookended several of his
films with live-action sequences that highlight the ingenuity, planning, skill, and
effort it took to produce them. In the live-action preludes to Little Nemo (1911),
Gertie the Dinosaur (1914), and The Sinking of the Lusitania (1918), title cards
announce the number of drawings that go into each film (4000, 10,000, and
25,000, respectively). Moreover, McCay shows himself engaged in the arduous
work of production (see Figure 2). McCay’s stage and film performances were
immensely influential on successive ranks of animation artists and studio heads.
Figure 1 James Stuart Blackton, Enchanted Drawing (1900) (Before Mickey: An Animated Anthology 1988).2 Winsor McCay, live action prelu e to Little Nemo (1911) (Before Mickey: An Anima ed Anthology 1988).
From Artisanship to Division of Labor
In the wake of the popularity of McCay’s first films, animation was revolutionized
along the lines of modern mass production and its technologies patented and
monopolized by John Randolph Bray, the “Henry Ford of animation” (Crafton
1982, p. 137). On the basis of his first film, The Artist’s Dream (1913), Bray signed
a distribution deal with Pathé that required a significant increase in his output.
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To fulfill the contract, Bray now had to “abandon individual control over produc-
tion and mete out the work to assistants – in other words, establish division of
labor”; he went so far as to move his studio to his upstate farm, boarding his artists
there during the week to keep them from the distractions of the city (Crafton
1982, pp. 147–148). With this contract between Pathé and Bray, Crafton indicates,
the transition from craft to industrial animation production was initiated. Bray
moved from the position of artist/worker to that of owner/manager, confronting
basic employer dilemmas: how to govern employees and labor processes so that
outcomes could “be reckoned … with precision and in advance” (Braverman 1998,
p. 39); how to “obscure and secure surplus value”, such that production and accu-
mulation could take place with a minimum of friction (Burawoy 1979, pp. 25–30).
Authority and Ownership
As new relations between producers, distributors, theaters, and audiences
shaped the growing film industry, two intertwined, emergent social institutions
shaped production and property relations. The two institutions were F. W.
Taylor’s principles of “scientific management” and copyright law’s new doctrine
of “work for hire”.
Figure 1 James Stuart Blackton, Enchanted Drawing (1900) (Before Mickey: An Animated
Anthology 1988).
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Taylor’s 1911 Principles of Scientific Management “epitomized the concept
of assembly-line studio animation”, providing a model for coordinating and
controlling animation workers in commercial production (Crafton 1982, p. 163).
Scientific management, or Taylorism, refers to the reconfiguring of work into
separate phases of “conception” and “execution” through employers’ gathering
of knowledge about existing production processes and their application of that
knowledge in breaking those processes down into simpler actions to be
performed by less-skilled, cheaper, more replaceable employees.5 Two of the
principle patents issued around this time — one of Bray’s, the other of his
competitor-cum-partner Earl Hurd — stress the efficiency gains associated with
the Taylorist treatment of the animation labor process. These patents registered
the capacity of new processes “to facilitate the rapid and inexpensive production
of a large number of pictures of a series” and “to enable … animated cartoons
to be made with the minimum of effort and expense” (quoted in Crafton 1982,
pp. 163–164). In 1920, an influential manual of commercial animation production
pointed out that through this kind of division of labor, “the actual toil of repeat-
ing monotonous details falls upon the tracer. The animator does the first plan-
ning and that part of the subsequent work requiring artistic ability” (quoted in
5.  In animation, the cheapest and most replaceable were often women and children.
Figure 2 Winsor McCay, live action prelude to Little Nemo (1911) (Before Mickey: An
Animated Anthology 1988).
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Crafton 1982, p. 165). This hierarchical division of labor remains the guiding prin-
ciple of animation production.
Second, the codification of work-for-hire doctrine in the 1909 US Copyright Act
established the alienability of works of authorship from their employee creators.
Prior to the last third of the nineteenth century, writes Catherine Fisk (2003a,
p. 32), “no court recognized that an employer was entitled to copyright the
works of its employees simply by virtue of the employment; indeed courts
assumed just the opposite”. Without a contract to the contrary, in other words,
employee-authors enjoyed rights to works created in the workplace. However,
over the course of the six decades preceding the 1909 Act, there took place a
“massive transfer of autonomy from creative workers to their employers” (Fisk
2003b, p. 4), as courts oversaw in piecemeal fashion a 180-degree shift in the
default rule of authorship. By 1910, in the USA, employers enjoyed initial copy-
right in employee works. This transformation of workplace property relations
took place without the usual adversary process. Work-for-hire law remains foun-
dational to cultural industry profitability through its facilitation and enforcement
of employer appropriation of employees’ and many independent contractors’
creative work(s).6
These changes in labor and property relations shaped a distribution of creative
labor among hierarchical strata of workers now alienated from the kinds of
autonomy and ownership with which the performative authorship of their
predecessors had correlated.7 Through the legal fiction at the heart of work for
hire — that the employee is essentially a claim-free instrument of the employer
(Ellerman 1992) — the studio owner became the author and owner of animated
characters, settings, and stories. The case of animator Otto Messmer and Felix
the Cat is paradigmatic: studio owner Pat Sullivan publicized himself as author
of, and claimed all the income from, the popular 1920s film series. According
to Al Eugster, a co-worker of Messmer’s, however, Sullivan’s involvement was
minimal: “I don’t think Pat was involved creatively, Otto would make up the
ideas … I wasn’t ever conscious of a script lying around the studio, everything just
sort of came out of Otto’s head” (quoted in Otto Messmer and Felix the Cat
2001). But even where studio owners did play creative roles, artists were
required to draw the things. No matter how precise or vague the instructions and
models they were given, early twentieth-century animation artists’ abilities to
6.  Copyright rules governing authorship and ownership of works produced under employment or
freelance contract differ around the world. The US, United Kingdom, Japanese, and Australian
systems generally vest the rights to employee work in employers, and have numerous provisions for
the similar treatment of works made under freelance contracts. Freedom of contract allows for a
wide variety of arrangements, but the relative market power of contracting parties intervenes to
support general patterns of rights distribution. France, Germany, and China tend toward vesting
rights in employee and independent contracting creators, but have numerous loopholes and provi-
sions for the securing of rights by employers and commissioning parties. Freedom of contract has a
narrower scope in these systems (Goldstein 2001; Sutherland et al. 2004).
7.  Mark Langer’s work in animation production history is exemplary in teasing out the power rela-
tions characteristic of pre-World War II animation studios. See especially his ‘Institutional Power and
the Fleischer Studios: The Standard Production Reference’ (Langer 1991).
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conceive and draw new forms presupposed and produced a form of work that
could not, in fact, be divided into “conception” and “execution”. All work is, to
some degree, conceptual; the limiting case of creative workers dramatizes the
fact that, in employment, “autonomy is both presupposed and denied”; that
“capacities or labour power cannot be used without the worker using his will, his
understanding and experience, to put them into effect” (Pateman 1988, pp. 47,
150–151). The patently conceptual work of employee artists would simply be
recategorized and treated as execution.
“Hand of the Artist” and “Magical Creator”
As were ownership and control, so also was self-figuration restricted to capi-
tal, despite the de facto dispersal of conceptual labor; creative workers
became increasingly obscured as they were further integrated into growing
divisions of animation labor. Where the visual space formerly occupied by
artistic workers was not totally eclipsed by the animated image, it became the
site of new representational practices that would cloak the new relation while
leaving the familiar generic convention of self-figuration in place. The “hand
of the artist” and the “magical creator” (Crafton 1982, p. 173) were new ways
of associating animated films with personal human creators. The “hand of the
artist” evokes Eugene V. Debs’ famous argument that “the working hand is
what is needed for the capitalist’s tool, and so the human must be reduced to
a hand” (quoted in Montgomery 1979, p. 69). An anonymous hand takes the
place of a recognizable artist, signifying increased anonymity in a division of
labor obscured by the image (see Figure 3). In the case of “magical creators”
like Max Fleischer and Walt Disney, the identifiable, named artist posited as
essential by Bill Ryan (1992, p. 42) is subsumed by a celebrity cultural capital-
ist functioning essentially as a brand, literally standing in for a division of
labor. He magically brings the animated figure to life, sometimes through an
act of drawing, but often through other means such as Max Fleischer’s infusion
of life into Koko the Clown by means of blowing breath into a blob of ink (see
Figure 4).
Figure 3 Bobby Bumps Puts a Beanery on the Bum (1918, Bray Studios, dir. Earl Hurd) (Before Mickey: An Animated Anthology 1988).4 Perpetual Motion (1920, Bra  Studios, dir. Max Fleischer) (Before Mickey: An Animated Anthology 1988).
Autonomy and Alienation in Contemporary Creative Animation Work
By the early twenty-first century, major changes had reshaped the animation
industry, introducing new formats and new technologies, speeding up produc-
tion, and radically internationalizing the division of labor. Many major US
studios are still signatories to contracts negotiated by the Animation Guild (an
affiliate of the enormous International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage
Employees, or IATSE, whose other members include grips, electricians, ward-
robe personnel, production designers, make-up artists, and set builders and
painters). New digital media specializations have now replaced much pencil,
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ink, and paintbrush work, but conceptual labor — in the form of what I have
called “non-proprietary authorship” (Stahl 2005) — is still widely distributed.
The field is still characterized by a hierarchical, even Taylorist structure in
which, especially in production for television, management shifts as much work
as possible onto lower-paid workers, many of whom work as independent
contractors and/or are located in Asia, Eastern Europe, or other regions
offering labor savings (Lent 2001; see also  DeLisle 2005; Scott 1988, 2005).
Moreover, alienation remains ironclad: employee artists, like other employees,
trade rights to self-determination and rights in their creative work(s) for
access to employment.8 In this section, a focus on storyboard artists highlights
some of the interactions of employment, autonomy, and alienation in contem-
porary animation production.
Storyboard Artists
In the words of one veteran, animation artists are “hired for their ability to
take something roughly defined and make it more specific” (quoted in Stahl
8.  For further consideration of this idea, see Macpherson (1973, p. 9).
Figure 3 Bobby Bumps Puts a Beanery on the Bum (1918, Bray Studios, dir. Earl Hurd)
(Before Mickey: An Animated Anthology 1988).
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2005, p. 96).9 This principle characterizes many stages of the process (for a
detailed analysis, see Winder & Dowlatabadi 2001). A project team of
producer(s), director(s), and writer(s) assigns a “sequence” to the storyboard
artist. In assignment meetings, members of the project team explain what
they want and usually provide a provisional script. The artist, typically over a
week or so, develops the sequence into a series of drawn panels in which char-
acters’ dialogue, positions, and interactions with each other, as well as props
and other visual features, are specified and blocked out. The artist pins these
panels to corkboards, as if they were panels in a comic strip, to be reviewed
by superiors.
After an initial meeting with a director and/or other members of the project
team (known in one studio as a “drive-by”), the artist reworks the sequence as
necessary and then hangs the corkboards on the wall of a conference room. Using
a pointer to guide his/her audience’s eyes, the artist then “pitches” his/her
boards back to the project team and other “story people”. In feature-film story-
boarding, this process is much like the kinds of pitching that take place in other
9.  The namelessness of the interview subjects is not meant to further reinforce their public
anonymity (in contrast with directors and star voice actors as well as with their forebears). The
interviews conducted for this research were undertaken anonymously in accordance with university
‘human subjects’ research protocols.
Figure 4 Perpetual Motion (1920, Bray Studios, dir. Max Fleischer) (Before Mickey: An
Animated Anthology 1988).
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production contexts: a creator attempts to “sell” decision makers on his/her
creation (Beiman 2007). The most successful storyboard pitching involves
approximating sound effects, voices and perspectives of characters, and gestur-
ing — acting out the sequence with body and voice as well as drawings (Beiman
2007, p. 236) (see Figure 5).
Figure 5 Shrek (2001) DVD special features.Following the pitch is a discussion between the members of the project team
about what “works” and what does not in the sequence. If changes are called for,
a new pitch may or may not be required. The sequence, once approved, becomes
a story element now existing primarily in relation to other elements, rather than
to the artist. Sometimes different artists are called in to rework the sequence or
to alter it to fit later changes to the story. This can be distressing to some story-
board artists, while others do not experience this alienation negatively: “Your
ideas are still there, they’re just redrawn for staging purposes. [T]hat’s what
I love about it: coming up with the concept and then seeing what people do with
it” (quoted in Neuwirth 2003, p. 106).
The work of storyboard artists figures prominently in the supplemental mate-
rial packaged with animation DVDs. Often they are portrayed as creative, ener-
getic, funny, and sensitive artists. But it would be a mistake to understand the
reappearance of the animation worker in such “making of” documentary features
as representing much in the way of organizational change, or perhaps anything
other than a new dimension of marketing (Sullivan 2007). Should this kind of
exposure accrue into individual star value for creative workers in animation, a
former Animation Guild union officer told me, “the producers are going to have
to abandon them and try and find somebody else who’s brand new” to do the job
at the customary rate (quoted in Stahl 2005, p. 103).
Figure 5 Shrek (2001) DVD special features.
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Autonomy and the Management of Alienation
Alienation, when not dismissed by cultural industries researchers altogether as a
naive or misleading critical category (for example, Miège 1989, p. 70), is most
often conceived in a social-psychological manner. In his 2007 book The Politics
of Cultural Work, Mark Banks generally appears to decry the use of the concept
of alienation through his critique of the critical theory approach to cultural labor.
Banks (2007, p. 94) suggests that this analytical approach simplistically perceives
cultural workers “to be deprived of autonomy and bereft of meaningful identity
as a consequence of their increased alienation from the conditions of produc-
tion”. However, he finds that even the most strident of the critical theorists now
back-pedal from their formerly more Manichean conceptions, conceding that
creative work cannot be “wholly alienated” because of the “spiritual, emotional,
or artistic” connections artists have with their work (p. 29). These connections
are part of a broader pattern of embeddedness (of social relations of cultural
work, for example [p. 26]) and subjectivity (p. 40) that obviates, or at least cuts
powerfully against, previous scholars’ macro-level, apparently theory-driven
findings of alienation.
The assumptions about alienation at the root of its apparent supersession as a
critical category in cultural industries research echo a definition articulated by
sociologist Robert Blauner in his influential 1964 book Alienation and Freedom.
Drawing on the earlier work of Melvin Seeman (1959; see also 1983) as well as
Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts , Blauner (1964) wrote that while
“the industrial system distributes [it] unevenly” (p. 5), 
[a]lienation is a general syndrome made up of a number of different objective
conditions and subjective feeling-states which emerge from certain relationships
between workers and the sociotechnical settings of employment. Alienation
exists when workers are unable to control their immediate work processes, to
develop a sense of purpose and function which connects their jobs to the over-
all organization of production, to belong to integrated industrial communities,
and when they fail to become involved in the activity of work as a mode of
personal self-expression. (Blauner 1964, p. 15)
If this explicitly social-psychological definition of alienation “as a quality of
personal experience” (Blauner 1964, p. 15) is implicitly accepted as the limit of
alienation (as Banks, for example, appears to do), then the autonomous, expres-
sive, meaningful, embedded situations of creative cultural workers — such as
those of storyboard artists in major film animation studios — appear to obviate
alienation as a useful critical category.
But this is not all there is to it. Alienation also has a material-legal meaning:
it describes the transference of a thing from one person to another. In classical
liberal thought, rights are reified, conceived as alienable bits of property. In
liberalism’s signal relationship, employment, “people alienate the right of self-
determination over their worktime … to the employer” (Ellerman 1992, p. 112).
In employment, people also alienate their rights to the products of their labor;
AQ8
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absent an agreement to the contrary, “normal day-to-day production is a site of
appropriation” (Ellerman 1992, p. 20). Animation studios’ insertion of creative
workers into the process of production as employees instantiates and rests on this
transfer of rights to governance and property: it codifies the burden of obedience
and streamlines corporate concentration of ownership, simplifying production
and marketing. As Jane Gaines (1991, p. 154) writes, the entertainment industry
employment contract is “magical … in its capacity to transform and transfer the
labor, rights, and property that society holds to be inalienable”.
However, the effects of studios’ power to alienate along these lines may be
mitigated in two primary ways, although each has its limits. On the one hand, as
cultural industries researchers make clear, firms’ requirements for new, market-
able cultural material, as well as the cultural discourses of art and creativity that
still attach to creative work and workers, combine to open spaces of social-
psychological de-alienation that enable creative workers to enjoy the “internal
rewards” of cultural work (Banks 2007, pp. 108–113). While these spaces serve to
seduce creative workers into offering discounted creative work on unfavorable
terms, Banks argues that they also hold out some progressive political promise
(see, for example, Banks 2007, pp. 184–185, 198n9). On the other hand, the
collective bargaining rights available to organized workers enable those workers
to maintain significant degrees of control over their labor and its products, which
are often strongly associated with improved social mobility and economic secu-
rity for qualifying workers.
First, both studios and creative animation workers are dependent on creative
work that both is and feels largely autonomous and conceptual — relatively
unalienated in social-psychological terms. Meaningful degrees of creative
autonomy both allow the creation of new intellectual property in excess of the
imaginings (but not of the requirements) of supervisory production teams and
give the storyboard artists the time and space to invest themselves in reward-
ing, expressive work. However, cracks appear when the creative work on which
studios and artistic identities depend is routinely carried out by workers who
are officially categorized as mere executants of the conceptual work of
others.10
One storyboard artist at a major Hollywood studio, accustomed to performing
satisfying but unrecognized (de facto but not de jure) authorship, phrased the
problem precisely in terms of a mismatch between job description and job
content: 
We’re doing more than storyboarding, we’re sort of getting to know the charac-
ters and sometimes we’ll add dialogue in, so then it starts getting into the gray
area, like with [a blockbuster animated feature film] and a lot of the artists, the
storyboard artists, came up with the gags that made people laugh, but at the
same point then the writers are being paid a lot of money and it’s their name, so
10.  Production studies researchers draw attention to the unrecognized creativity of ‘below-the-line’
‘technical’ labor (for example, Banks 2009, p. 91; Landman 2009, p. 146; see also Hesmondhalgh
2007, pp. 64–69).
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people think that the writers wrote all these gags and funny stuff. (quoted in
Stahl 2005, p. 100)
Storyboard artists like the one quoted above express themselves in the perfor-
mance of their work; for them, drawing is 
very much a part of who you are and your identity and what you’re good at and
very intertwined with your whole emotional self … [i]t’s not just about, you
know, a job; it’s not just about doing a, b, c, you know, and it’s done. (quoted
in Stahl 2005, p. 102)
The same emotional investments that make the work meaningful can contrib-
ute to stress and dissatisfaction when artists are reminded of their official
status as technical workers and of the attending forms of control and owner-
ship to which they are subject. When conception and execution are intermin-
gled, the politics of production become more apparent and consent is at risk
(Burawoy 1985, p. 49).11 But as long as the unrecognized, uncompensated
conceptual work rewards those emotional investments, this risk is minimized
(Ursell 2000, p. 821). For the most part, the relative autonomy with which
storyboard artists do their work (along with their embeddedness in occupa-
tional communities, sometimes very high pay, union benefits, and the profes-
sional prestige available to them) makes up for their routine alienation from
the kinds of credit and compensation reserved for officially recognized concep-
tual workers (for example, writers under the jurisdiction of the Writers Guild of
America).
Because of this general buffering, employer command and appropriation can
seem exceptionally harsh when it exceeds or obtrudes into the normal routine.
In animation storyboarding, the linkage of employment and alienation becomes
starker when supervisors close up the space of rewarding, relatively autonomous
artistry and require artists to do what in other work worlds would have a very
different meaning as “work to rule”. In such a situation, storyboard artists can
experience a degree of alienation that can approach the insupportable. One
artist offers a provocative metaphor: 
Sometimes you do feel like a wrist, you know, you really do feel like a wrist. It’s
like, my friends say, they’re on a film and they’re not happy and it’s like
[members of the project team] don’t want to listen to anything you say. “They
just shoot [down] whatever ideas we have; we’re just wrists.” Basically, you’re
just drawing pictures, you’re not giving anything, they’re not asking your opin-
ion, just like “draw it, so we can get it up and see what it looks like”. (quoted in
Stahl 2005, p. 101; see also Sito 2006, p. 30)
11.  Dan Lund and Tony West’s documentary film Dream on Silly Dreamer (2004) exemplifies
Burawoy’s proposition. The film presents the reflections of a number of Disney Studios’ ‘traditional’
animation artists (pencil, not computer users) following their mass firing in 2002 as part of Disney’s
transition to computer animation production. The sophistication of their analyses of their positions
with respect to surplus is striking.
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The imperative outlined here is to become a drawing instrument or jeopardize
your employment. Carole Pateman (1988, p. 151) writes: “The employment
contract, necessarily, gives the employer political right to compel the worker to
use his capacities in a given manner, or the right to the worker’s obedience.” The
alienation or transfer of rights by way of employment enables directors and
producers to exercise the right to deprive the storyboard artists of their custom-
ary freedom to work expressively, beyond the limits of their job description as
mere transcribers. This political right might not seem to define the day-to-day
subjective experience of the relatively autonomous creative employee, but it is
never out of the picture (Davidov 2002, p. 381). In the major Hollywood anima-
tion studios, the employers’ exercise of political right along these lines disrupts
what are otherwise self-actualizing, expressive work experiences, reducing
creative workers to their baseline legal status as employees, “servants in the
technical sense of the word” (Ellerman 1992, p. 103).
Collective Bargaining and Limits to Alienation
An artist’s encounter with the employer’s right to govern evinces both forms of
alienation: a “personal experience” of powerlessness and the fact of having to
choose in that instant between obedience/expropriation and jeopardizing the
employment. However, the unionization of the US animation industry in the mid
twentieth century secured significant rights and benefits for animation workers
at signatory studios that set limits on their material-legal alienation.12 Despite
their vulnerability to genuinely distressing forms of alienation, those artists who
are members of the Animation Guild, working at signatory studios, enjoy certain
collectively bargained degrees of control over their labor and quasi-proprietary
rights to industry profits.
The Animation Guild’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA; Animation Guild
2009) limits the power of the signatory studio to dictate the terms of employ-
ment to individuals. Signatory studios are restrained in their ability to absorb and
expel workers; lay-offs, firings, and technological displacement are governed by
passages in the contract that maintain forms of friction beneficial to employees,
adding measures of stability to their otherwise less stable careers. The CBA sets
out rates of severance pay for legitimate dismissals and governs overtime pay,
setting a lower threshold than that provided by state law. The agreement also
sets wage minimums, and decrees that employment by the day requires a daily
minimum of four hours and is paid at around 118% of standard hourly wages, to
account for holiday and vacation pay that would accrue under normal circum-
stances. These rights protect member workers in signatory studios from forms of
force, supporting their meaningful right to say no to certain arrangements with-
out jeopardizing their employment.
12.  For accounts of this series of complex and acrimonious struggles, see Deneroff (1987), Denning
(1997, pp. 403–422), Sito (2006, chs 3–5), and Watts (1997, pp. 203–227).
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Collective bargaining has also enabled cultural industry workers to make
claims on industry profits in the form of what are known in the USA as “residuals”
or “reuse payments”. These were initially established on the basis that the reuse
of existing work (a song or television program, or cartoon or advertisement, for
example) reduced the overall demand for creative labor (Paul & Kleingartner
1994, 1996; Stahl 2009). Residuals function like a payment for a compulsory
license: in most cases, the creative worker has no right or opportunity to refuse
the reuse, but he/she must be paid if his/her recorded performance in a song,
cartoon, advertisement, film, or television show is to be reused beyond its initial
use or run. Residual income is collected and distributed by entertainment unions
and guilds. Animation artists are entitled through their Basic Agreement to
collective residuals (in contrast to the individual payments to which “above-the-
line” or “creative” employee members of the Writers or Screen Actors Guilds are
entitled, for example). These amounts are figured as a percentage of annual
“supplemental markets” income (profits on DVD and videocassette sales), paid
by producers into the IATSE “health and welfare” fund.13
The power of collective bargaining to limit the degrees of material-legal alien-
ation of employees is significant not only because of its long-term impacts on work-
ers’ social security and mobility. It also proliferates into the social-psychological
dimensions of work. As an artist working in a non-signatory major film animation
studio told me: 
The [studio] campus is kind of like, remember the old Time Machine with the Eloi
and the Morlocks? It’s like the Eloi are walking around on the surface and they’re
wearing togas and they’re all blond and beautiful, eating fruit off the trees, and
then one of the Eloi drowns, and they just watch him sort of drown, without help-
ing him. And then you have the Morlocks, and the Morlocks are sort of a metaphor
of that paranoia. Get all the free soda that you want, and you get stock and you
get great benefits [while you’re working there] and if you have a kid, you know
there’s daycare for your kid, but you’ve got to watch your ass, you really gotta
watch your ass. (Author interview, North Hollywood, CA, 20 January 2004)
You “gotta watch your ass” because, under the “at-will” employment form that
governs non-unionized employment, the studio can fire you with minimal fric-
tion. “At my studio,” this artist continued, “you gotta drink the Kool-Aid. I’m
serious man, you gotta make the producer happy and you gotta make your direc-
tors happy and you gotta make your art directors happy”; otherwise you may be
fired tout de suite. The “paranoia” of creative workers in this industry is reduced
where a CBA sets the terms on which individuals can be fired or laid off; where
13.  While limiting their material-legal alienation from the products on which they work in a general
way, and contributing significantly to their pension and health benefits, these collective residuals
paradoxically reinforce animation workers’ sense of alienation from the specific products to which
they have made contributions. Because they do not receive the individual, ‘pocket’ residuals to
which officially creative cultural workers are accustomed, many animation artists believe they get
no residuals at all. ‘It’s not fair,’ wrote an anonymous respondent to a union survey, ‘that animation
has some of longest lasting product in all of entertainment, yet its principal creators don’t even get
a token benefit of hundreds of repeats’ (‘Animation Writers’ Survey’ 1999).
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residuals-supported, union-managed health and pension plans provide significant
forms of social security; and where the forms of alienation codified in the liberal
employment relation are restricted not only by cultural discourses of art and
artistic creativity, but by legally binding arrangements that offset employer
power (while they nevertheless ironically reinforce its legitimacy).
As long as such rights are not statutorily inalienable but achieved through
bargaining, the power of workers collectively to demand them may be under-
mined by changing political-economic conditions. The Animation Guild’s power
(like that of most other US unions) has waned since the 1970s, as the offshoring
of many aspects of animation production put many artists out of work and
knocked the wage floor out from under many others (Sito 2006, pp. 251–284), and
as other political-economic changes conspired to shift the balance of power
between workers and studios. Few young animation artists will be able to look
forward to the kinds of careers (and retirements) of those who established them-
selves in the 1990s and earlier.
“Force” and the “Forces of Art”
Jane Gaines (1991, p. 155) argues that “it is the transferability of rights that is
the basis of the mass marketing of the human image and the human voice in the
communications industries”. In cultural industries large and small, this transfer-
ability — this alienability — is often achieved through employment. Engaging the
critical categories of employment and alienation brings new angles of inquiry to
cultural industries research. For example, David Hesmondhalgh writes: 
However rewarding they find their work, nearly all symbol creators seem at some
point to experience the constraints imposed on them in the name of profit accu-
mulation as stressful and/or oppressive and/or disrespectful. Many are forced to
do “creative” work that they hardly experience as creative at all. (Hesmondhalgh
2007, p. 70)
Hesmondhalgh’s evocation of coercive pressure is consistent with a concern for
the often perilous conditions of creative workers. However, the specificities of
“force” pass largely without elaboration in a work aimed at least in part to
“assess the degree to which cultural production is organized in a socially just
manner” (Hesmondhalgh 2007, p. 37). An understanding of social power as coer-
cion, writes Hesmondhalgh (2007, p. 207), might not appear equal to the task of
explaining why creative workers are willing to give up “financial reward and
security for creative autonomy”, but that should not mean that we reject such a
model outright. Without a critique of employment as an alienating mode of inser-
tion of creative workers, as well as other kinds of workers, into the process of
production, we are inhibited from asking on what basis, why, or by whom
“symbol creators” may be “forced” to do anything whatsoever.
Probing this issue of force necessitates throwing common-sense conceptions of
voluntarism, autonomy, and coercion into question. Indeed, to the degree that
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“democracy” is understood to depend on adult members’ inalienable rights to
participate in governing and inalienable responsibilities for their own conscious
actions, probing the issue of force requires that we treat the relationship of liber-
alism and democracy as antagonistic. Numerous scholars have argued that
employer governance and appropriation are neither socially just nor consistent
with democratic principles (for example, Davidov 2002; Linder 1989; Macpherson
1977; Pateman 2002; Steinfeld 2001). Many deploy their critiques as part of
social-democratic political projects, including, for example Pateman’s involve-
ment with the burgeoning “basic income” movement.
The potential dissolution of some of the analytical boundaries between cultural
and other forms of work may appear to lead down an analytical rabbit hole. What
is distinctive about cultural industry labor if, as I argue, it can or should be consid-
ered in the context of structures and institutions that condition all employment?
Of what use is such an analysis without clear boundaries? I pose an answer to
these questions in the form of another question. Mark Banks (2007, p. 8) writes
that “[t]he creative cultural worker exists at the very axis point of political strug-
gle between the forces of art and commerce”. My question is this: Are “the forces
of art and commerce” really commensurable? Commerce has had forces in the
fields for centuries. Buoyed by aggressive intellectual movements like classical
political economy, contractarianism, and neo-liberal philosophy, capitalists
certainly compete, but they also combine to precipitate social, political,
cultural, and legal conditions favorable to their shared goals of growth and profit.
It is a contradiction of questionable validity, but not because art is autonomous
from commerce. Could the notion of “forces of art” perhaps suggest something
other than an artistic “equivalent” of the forces of commerce? Could “forces of
art” be a stand-in for a democratizing impulse that dare not speak its name?
Questions of self-government — framed in terms of autonomy and self-
determination — are at the center of the cultural industries perspective’s labor
research agenda. I am suggesting, in other words, that cultural industries
researchers’ explicit linkage of the “art” aspect of the binary to “autonomy”
correlates to an implicit linkage of “commerce” to domination. Further, I am
suggesting that this dual articulation can and should lead us to understand the
art–capital contradiction in an additional way, as a metonymic emanation in
liberal-market society of a deeply seated democracy–employment contradiction.
Cultural industries researchers are compelled by artistic autonomy, I hypothe-
size, at least in part because it tantalizes us politically. Banks (2007, pp. 184–
185) argues that “creative cultural production remains imbued with utopian
promise”, and that it is in creative workers’ “institutionalized permission to
rebel that we can identify the key radical potential of cultural work”. Specifying
as many of the determinants, lineaments, and limits of this utopian promise and
radical potential as possible will not only help us understand the politics of
creative cultural work more fully. Such an inquiry, I believe, will also help us to
see the possibilities for the fuller realization of creative cultural workers’
extraordinary and durable privileges, and the proliferation of those privileges
into other worlds of work.
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Conclusion
Cultural industries’ dependence on novelty requires granting creative workers
(varying and limited but) significant degrees of autonomy. Such workers derive
substantial social-psychological benefits from this arrangement and thus seem
less or unalienated in comparison to those in other sectors, even where their
working lives might be more unpredictable. When workers are integrated into
enterprises by way of employment (as opposed to independent contracting), the
principle of institutionalized autonomy operates in conjunction with two other
principles less studied by cultural industries researchers: the employment rela-
tion and employer appropriation of intellectual property. This article has
borrowed analytical tools from political theory to distinguish employment as a
“mode of insertion of cultural labor into the general process of production”
(Miège 1992, p. 25) . In this perspective, the employment relation constitutes a
political framework around employers and employees in which the latter transfer
rights to self-governance and property to the former in exchange for access to
the means of making a living. However autonomous the routine of a given
creative workplace, employers or their agents retain the right to the employee’s
obedience and property in his/her creative work(s). Approaching employment in
this way enables the reconception of the “art–commerce contradiction” as an
emanation in market society of a “democracy–employment contradiction”, link-
ing the particular lots of creative cultural workers to a broader set of problems
confronted by working people (and democratic theorists) on a regular basis.
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